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By Michael B. Kent Jr.

Qualified Immunity in
the Eleventh Circuit
After Hope v. Pelzer

T

he defense of qualified immunity protects government
officials performing discretionary functions from liability, trial, and other burdens of civil litigation (such as dis-

covery), as long as their conduct does not violate “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”1 This defense, which ultimately derives from the com-

mon law immunity enjoyed by judicial officers2, plays a significant
role in lawsuits alleging constitutional or civil rights violations by officials of local governments.3 In situations where officials are forced to
make quick decisions under volatile circumstances — for example,
when a police officer must use force to effect an arrest — the defense
is particularly necessary to balance the rights of individuals legitimately falling victim to abuse of power against the costs that insubstantial litigation imposes on society.4
22
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(5) the official’s entitlement to quali-

unlawfulness of the guards’ actions

fied immunity is the usual rule.

must have been apparent in light of
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HOPE V. PELZER
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Smith v. Mattox — i.e., the guards’
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the law is established by judicial

Nonetheless, as recognized in Hope

the applicable legal standard is char-

precedents, notice can be given by

itself, the unlawfulness must be

acterized by broad generalities and

preexisting cases with indistinguish-

apparent, and “[i]n many — if not

abstract principles — which is true

able facts.47 If the facts of prior

most — instances, the apparency of

of many, if not most legal standards

precedents are “fairly distinguish-

an unlawful action will be estab-

— “preexisting caselaw that has

able from the circumstances facing a

lished by (if it can be established at

applied general law to specific cir-

government official,” however, the

all) preexisting caselaw which is

cumstances will almost always be

law is not clearly established and

sufficiently similar in facts to the

necessary to draw a line that is capa-

attaches.48

In

facts confronting an officer, such

ble of giving fair and clear notice

addition, the court strongly suggest-

that we can say every objectively

than an official’s conduct will violate

ed that only the holding of prior

reasonable officer would have been

federal law.”59 And the court

precedents, and not dicta contained

on ‘fair notice’ that the behavior

expressly reaffirmed that, in such

qualified immunity

in the court’s analysis, can provide
the requisite

notice.49

violated a constitutional

right.”54

circumstances, only decisions of the

The judicial

The Eleventh Circuit echoed this

dicta cited in Hope, explained the

sentiment in the final decision of the

Circuit, or the highest court of the

court, merely strengthened the

post-Hope

triumvirate.55

Again, the

state in which the case arose — in

notice that already had been provid-

court explained that Hope’s “fair

other words, precedent binding on

ed by binding precedent.50

warning” standard stems from the

the officials accused of the violation

The next Eleventh Circuit deci-

requirement that the unlawfulness

— can provide the requisite notice.60

sion meaningfully to address Hope

of the official’s conduct be apparent

Putting these three decisions

began by stating emphatically that

in light of clearly established, preex-

together yields the conclusion that,

law.56

Supreme

Court,

the

Eleventh

Hope “did not change the preexist-

isting

And again, citing Smith

despite the doubts raised by Hope,

ing law of the Eleventh Circuit

v. Mattox, the court acknowledged

the Eleventh Circuit’s qualified

much.”51

Taking its lead straight

that “factually similar case are not

immunity law remains for the most

from Hope’s requirement that pre-

always necessary to established that

part unchanged. All three decisions

existing law give an official fair

a government actor was on notice

explain that “fair warning” flows

warning, the court explained that

that certain conduct is unlawful.”57

from the need for clearly established

fair warning flowed from “the

In the narrow category of cases

law rendering the unlawfulness of

applicable law’s being ‘clearly

where an official’s conduct is so

an official’s conduct apparent. All

established’ at the time of the offi-

beyond the pale that he or she must

three decisions state that, under nor-

conduct.”52

be aware of the unlawfulness of his

mal circumstances, the law is clearly

The court also explained that Hope’s

actions, no factually similar prior

established by prior cases with very

“fair warning” standard was not

needed.58

similar facts. All three decisions

cial’s alleged unlawful

precedent is

But, where

substantively different than the law
as stated by the Eleventh Circuit
prior to Hope, which did not require
the “rigid gloss” perceived by the
Supreme Court. Citing a line of
cases beginning with Smith v.
Mattox, the court noted that it
“ha[d] repeatedly acknowledged
the possibility that a general statement of the law might provide adequate notice of unlawfulness in the
right
October 2003

circumstances.”53
27

acknowledge that factually similar

rules applied post-Hope are almost

precedent is not always required,

identical to their pre-Hope counter-

and all three make clear that the

parts. Accordingly, as it was before

Eleventh Circuit has never required

Hope, the defense of qualified

factually similar precedent in all

immunity continues to be the

cases. Finally, two of the decisions

threshold issue in civil rights cases

reveal that the body and type of

against local government officials,

precedent to which courts should

and those officials can still find

look when analyzing qualified

comfort that, in most cases, their

immunity remains the same as it

entitlement to qualified immunity

was before Hope. Thus, the law of

will be upheld.

the Eleventh Circuit after Hope can
be stated as follows: (1) to defeat a
defense of qualified immunity, preexisting case law with indistinguishably similar facts generally must
define the law sufficiently to give
every objectively reasonable officer
“fair warning” that the behavior in
question violates a federal right; (2)
only case law from the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the
highest court of the relevant state
can provide the requisite warning;
(3) only the holdings of such case
law, and not the dicta contained in
judicial opinions, are useful in the
qualified immunity analysis; (4) preexisting case law is not required in the
narrow category of cases where the
official’s misconduct is so egregious
that he or she must be aware that he
or she is acting illegally; and (5) the
official’s entitlement to qualified
immunity is the usual rule.

CONCLUSION
A comparison of the Eleventh
Circuit’s

post-Hope

qualified

immunity cases with those rendered by the court prior to Hope
demonstrates that Hope wrought
no substantive change in the law
governing an official’s entitlement
to qualified immunity. In fact, the
28
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County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1031 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
Id.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1354 n.27 (noting that there
exists “an important difference
between the holding in a case and
the reasoning that supports that
holding”).
Id.
Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d
1299, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1302.
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54. Id.
55. See Thomas v. Roberts, — F.3d — ,
No. 00-11361 (11th Cir. Mar. 10,
2003), available at 2003 WL 934249.
56. Id. at 2003 WL 934249 *3.
57. Id. at *6.
58. Id. One example of such a case is
provided by Vaughan v. Cox, F.3d -, No. 00-14380 (11th Cir. Aug.
29, 2003), available at 2003 WL
22025451. In Vaughan, the defendant officer fired three rounds
without warning into a suspect
vehicle on Interstate 85 in Coweta
County. The court first held that
the evidence, when viewed in the
plaintiff’s favor, would allow a
reasonable jury to determine that
the officer violated the plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable seizure. See id. at *34. Additionally, this same evidence, when viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, would likewise defeat
the officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity because it permitted
the following inferences: (1) the
plaintiff did not pose an immediate threat of serious harm; (2) the
use of deadly force was not necessary to effect a stop of the plaintiff’s vehicle; and (3) it was feasible
for the officer to warn the plaintiff
before using such force. See id. at
*4-5. Although the court did not
cite Smith v. Mattox, its opinion
shows that the court considered
the case to fit (depending on the
true facts) within the Smith v.
Mattox corollary. If the facts were
as alleged by the plaintiff, then “an
objectively reasonable officer in
[the defendant’s] position could
not have believed that he was entitled to use deadly force . . . .” Id. at
*6. Put differently, if the plaintiff’s
version of events were true, then
the officer’s conduct lay “so obviously at the very core of what the
Fourth Amendment prohibits” that
it went beyond “[t]he hazy border
between permissible and forbidden force.” See Smith v. Mattox,
127 F.3d at 1419. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff’s version of
events was not true, then “the
qualified immunity analysis would
be changed,” and the defendant
would be entitled to the defense.
See Vaughan, 2003 WL 22025451 at
*6. And because the officer’s enti-

tlement to qualified immunity
depended on the actual version of
events, the court held that the officer should be allowed to pose special interrogatories to the jury to
resolve the specific factual disputes on which the qualified
immunity analysis depended. Id.
Of course, the jury would decide
only “the issues of historical fact
that are determinative of the qualified immunity defense,” while the
court (and it only) would determine as a matter of law whether
those facts entitled the officer to
the defense. See Johnson v.
Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2002); see also Cottrell v.
Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1488 (11th
Cir. 1996). The procedure
employed in Vaughan thus comports with pre-Hope decisions of
the Eleventh Circuit, and while the
denial of qualified immunity
seems anomalous at first blush,
nothing in Vaughan suggests a
sea-change in the Eleventh
Circuit’s qualified immunity
jurisprudence.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *3.
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